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INSIDERS' LIABILITIES
UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
by
Roy L. Cole*

W

HILE there was a considerable drive toward corporate law
reform in the 1910's and 1920's, the stock market crash of
1929 and the ensuing depression provided the ultimate impetus to
the enactment of the Federal Securities Act of 1933,' the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,' and the other acts which make up the body
of federal securities regulation.3 The Securities Act of 1933 was passed
to protect the public against losses through unethical and dishonest
practices on the part of persons and corporations selling newlyissued securities.' It was followed in 1934 by the Securities Exchange
Act, which was primarily concerned with the regulation of stock
trading rather than initial distribution, and was intended to require
the dissemination of at least a minimum amount of information
to persons who buy and sell securities, to regulate the securities
markets, and to control the amount of the nation's credit channeled
into those markets.'
As stated in the 1934 report of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, which shortly preceded the passing of the Securities
Exchange Act:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the
subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by
* A.B. 1942, Baylor University; LL.B. 1947, University of Texas; Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
148 St at. 74, 15 U.S.C.A.. § 77a-77aa (1951).
'48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 78a-78jj (1951).
aThe other acts in the series are: Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79-79z-6 (1951); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 48 Stat. 95,
15 U.S.C.A. 55 77aaa-77bbb (1951); Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847,
11 U.S.C.A. 55 72-107 (1946); Stat. -,
15 U.S.C.A. 55 80a-1-80a-52 (1951); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 852, U.S.C.A. 55 80b-1-80b-21 (1951);
Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938); 11 U.S.C.A. 5§ 501-676 (1941). For a detailed
background of the securities statutes, see Loss, Securities Regulation
6-105 (1951).
'Address by President Roosevelt, March 29, 1933, S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
6-7 (1933); H.'R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess.1-2 (1933).
'Loss, op. cit.supra note 3, at 84.
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directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust
and the confidential information which came to them in such positions,
to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of
abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large
stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient
control over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire
and profit by information not available to others.!
To curb the abuses referred to, at least in part, section 16 was incorporated into the Securities Exchange Act.! Section 16 (a) requires
that each beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of any class
of equity security of a company having an equity security registered on a national securities exchange, and every person who is a
director or officer of such a company, file (at the time of the registration of such security or within ten days after such person
becomes a beneficial owner, director or officer) a statement of his
ownership of all classes of equity securities of the issuer; it further
provides that such person must give monthly reports of all changes
in his ownership of such equity securities thereafter. This subsection
is grounded on the premise that persons in position to obtain large
profits from stock manipulations because of their "insider" status
in the corporation will discontinue their manipulations if forced to
publicize them.
Section 16(b) provides that any profit realized by a director,
officer, or beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of any class
of equity security of a company having an equity security registered
on a national exchange, which profit is realized from any purchase
and sale or any sale and purchase of any equity security of his
company within any period of less than six months, must be paid
over to the company of which the profiteer is a director, officer, or
beneficial owner. The idea behind section 16(b) is, of course, that
if one cannot retain the profits from transactions based on his peculiar knowledge of a company's affairs, he will not engage in such
transactions.
Section 16(c) prohibits short sales by insiders and likewise prohibits insiders from "selling against the box," that is, selling securities and then borrowing like securities to meet the commitment,
in the hope of later replacing the borrowed securities at a lower price.
The Securities Exchange Commission has issued a number of rulings under subsections (a) and (c), but has never attempted to
apply the criminal sanctions of subsection (c). The most important
6

S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
48 Stat. 196; 15 U.S.C.A. 5 78p(b)

7June 6, 194, c. 404, 5 16(b),

(1951).
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deterrent to prevent insiders from making use of their connections
to obtain personal profits at the expense of investors not having
access to such information, is section 16(b).'
For almost ten years after the Securities Exchange Act was passed
there was no litigation under section 16. But the next similar period
saw the establishment of a great many principles applicable to insiders' profits. The most significant cases were Snoloswe v. Delendo
Corp,.' Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte," Truncale v. Blumberg,"
and Shaw v. Dreyfus" in the substantive field; Gratz v. Claughton,"'

the Park & Tilford case, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Jenkins,' Grossman v. Young," Benisch v. Cameron," and Arbetman
v. Playford"' were significant in the procedural area. The Park &
Tilford, Dottenheim,' and Berkey & Gay "0cases established a rule
for the allowance of attorney's fees to the complaining stockholder

out of the funds recovered on behalf of the corporation; and Wil-

liam F. Davis, Jr.," apparently established a firm rule that the insider forced to disgorge profits from short-swing transactions in
his company's stock can not obtain the benefits of an income tax
deduction for such repayments.
"Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer
in
the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such
suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
same
thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after
the date
such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or
transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt
as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
9 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
10 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947).
1180 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
" 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1948).
13 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951).
" 7 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
1370 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
'6 l F. Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
'783 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
"SDottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
loBerkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Wigmore, Civil No. 40-147, S.D.N.Y. 1947.
'o17 T.C, 549 (1951).
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While these cases will be discussed under the appropriate headings,
they have been well and exhaustively treated heretofore, 1 and the
emphasis of this paper will be on subsequent developments.
I.

GENERAL

OBJECTIVES,

CONSTITUTIONALITY,

AND

COVERAGE

Although section 16(b) is at best a crude and limited device for
preventing insiders from misusing their special corporate infor-

mation, 2 the courts have almost without exception construed it as
broadly as possible. In the first decided case, Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., the Second Circuit set a broad pattern of liberal interpretation to effectuate congressional intent which has prevailed ever
since. In holding that section 16 (b) requires an insider to turn
over profits from short-swing dealings 3 to the corporation regardless of whether or not in the particular instance he had made use
of any private information obtained by virtue of his connection

with the corporation, the court said that the fact that bona fide
transactions might be caught in the net of the statute could not
affect the right of Congress to strike at the tendency to evil in other
cases by an imposition of an absolute rule of turning over profits
in every case. The court quoted with approval the language of the
United States Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp!' (a case
dealing with the Public Utility Holding Company Act) as follows:
Abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may
raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively
only by prohibitions not concerned with the fairness of a particular
transaction."

The court rejected the defendant's contention that section 16(b)
would not apply to a situation where an insider acquires a certifi1 See particularly Cook and Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange
Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 612 (1953). Also see Rubin and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
468 (1947); Comment, 27 Texas L. Rev. 840 (1947). Since its publication the Cook
and Feldman article in the Harvard Law Review has been cited in most' § 16(b) cases.
2For example, § 16(b) covers only buy and sell (or sell and buy) transactions completed within a six-months' period. It cannot touch the situation where the insider purchases securities and disposes of them six months and one day later, or the converse
situation where the insider sells securities and does not repurchase until six months and
one day later. Nor does it attempt to cover the situation where the insider gives "tips"
to members of his family who make profits by use of the information, nor a situation
where insiders of two companies exchange information, with each making a profit by
use of the information in transactions in the other's stock.
23""Short-swing profits" are those required by the act to be paid over to the corporation-that is, profits made on purchases and sales, or sales and purchases, completed
within a six-months' period.
24318 U.S.
21136

80 (1943).

F.2d 231, 240 (1943).
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cate for 100 shares of stock, waits six months and acquires a certificate for another 100 shares of stock, then on the next day sells
the shares represented by the first certificate. Such a ruling would
completely emasculate the statute, since:
Under the basic rule of identifying the stock certificate, the large stockholder, who in most cases is also an officer or director, could speculate
in long sales with impunity merely by reason of having a reserve of
stock and upon carefully choosing his stock certificates for delivery
upon his sales from this reserve. Moreover, his profits from any sale
followed by a purchase would be practically untouchable, for the principle of identity admits of no gain without laboring proof of a subjective intent-always a nebulous issue-to effectuate the connected
phases of this type transaction. In consequence the statute would be
substantially emasculated. We cannot ascribe to it a meaning so inconsistent with its declared purpose."
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte reaffirmed the constitutionality of
section 16(b) and its effectiveness to require the payment to the
corporation of all short-swing profits irrespective of whether such
profits were or were not made through the use of inside information.
The next Second Circuit case involving section 16(b) was Gratz
v. Claughton. While most important for its pronouncements on
procedural matters, the court for the third time affirmed the constitutionality of section 16 (b), reaffirmed the holding of the Smolowe case that transactions need not be matched by identifying the
shares dealt in, and established the rule that, for purposes of pairing
sales and purchases, a sale may be matched against any purchase at
a lower price within six months before the sale or within six months
afterwards."
In one of the comparatively rare section 16(b) decisions arising
outside of the Southern District of New York,2" Walet v. Jefferson
Lake Sulphur Co.,"5 the Fifth Circuit dealt with an admitted
$36,000.00 short-swing profit made by the company's president. In
"

Id. at 238.
2'The defendant

had insisted that, in applying the six-month limitation of § 16(b),

any given sale could only be matched with a purchase no more than three months preceding or three months after the sale. In regard to the effect of its overruling the defendant's contention, the court said: "It is true that this means that no director, officer,
or 'beneficial owner' may safely buy and sell, or sell and buy, shares of stock in the
company except at intervals of six months. Whether that is too drastic a means of
meeting the evil, we have not to decide; it is enough that we can find no other way
to administer the statute." 187 F.2d 46, 52 (1951).
"SUnder § 27 of the act, a § 16(b) action may be brought in the district wherein
"any act or transaction constituting the violation" occurs. Since most sales and purchases
of listed stocks take place on Manhattan exchange floors, the overwhelming majority of
§ 16(b) cases are filed in the courts of the Southern District of New York. See also
Gratz v. Claughton, supra.
29202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
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November of 1950, the defendant acquired 1,200 shares of treasury
stock pursuant to an option granted to him for "extraordinarily
meritorious services." His profits during the following six months
were from the sale of shares other than those acquired pursuant to
the option. In affirming the president's liability to pay his profits
over to the corporation, the Fifth Circuit followed Gratz v.'Claughton and Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., rejecting the defendant's claim
of non-liability based on his complete good faith, the absence of any
inside information, and the fact that the sales were of different
shares from those purchased. However, the Walet case is important
not only in being a fresh decision from another circuit following the
Gratz and Smolowe cases, but in extending the views expressed by
the Second Circuit and securing for section 16(b), as far as permissible under the statutory language, a far-reaching power to effectuate the broad equitable purposes of Congress.
First, the court rejected defendant's contention that only onehalf of any profits were repayable to the corporation since the other
half was realized, under the community property laws of Louisiana,
not by him but by his wife. It was pointed out that in Louisiana the
husband is the head and master of the community and as such must
be held accountable for his management thereof, and further that
"any other rule would defeat the purpose of the statute here under
consideration, at least in part, in community-property states. In such
circumstances,
Federal policy must prevail over the vagaries in local
0
laws."'

Next the court rejected the defendant's argument that treasury
shares are not "equity securities" and thus not within the provisions
of section 16(b). This argument was based upon the fact that treasury shares are specifically included in the statutory definition of
"security"' 1 but omitted from the definition of "equity security."'"
In disposing of this contention the court said:
We think this omission lacks the significance that the appellant would
attribute to it. Included in the definition of 'equity security' is the
generic phrase 'stock or similar security,' which embraces treasury
stock; and, in any event, treasury stock by the very fact of its purchase and issuance ceases to be such and becomes outstanding or nontreasury stock.33

Finally, the court held in Walet that not only is it no defense that
the defendant acts in the utmost good faith, without any inside in3 Id. at 434, citing Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 2, at § 3 (a) (10).

32 Id.at § 3(a)(I1).

33202 F.2d 433, 435 (1953).
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formation whatsoever, and without any damage to the company or
its stockholders as a result of his acts, but also that a corporation, by
granting an option to an employee or director for extraordinarily
metitorious services, cannot thereby be held to have waived the
benefits of section 16(b) in the event that the option is exercised
and the officer or director obtains a profit with respect to the same
or similar shares sold within six months after the exercise.
All three of these principles enunciated in Walet seem completely
justified and entirely consistent with the congressional purpose underlying the Securities Exchange Act; indeed, contrary holdings would
severely restrict the accomplishment of the purposes for which section 16 (b) was enacted.
In Pellegrino v. Nesbit,4 the Ninth Circuit had occasion to consider a claimed estoppel situation. Consolidated Engineering Corporation had granted stock options to three officers. Later the corporation's president, when informed by the optionees that they were
financially unable to exercise the options and purchase the stock
without concurrently selling a portion of the purchased stock to pay
for the stock retained, told the optionees that they could effect sales
of a portion of their stock through a brokerage house of which one
of the directors of the corporation was a partner. The Ninth Circuit
held that the plea of estoppel against the corporation to claim the
profits from the sales could not stand. "
The defense of estoppel against the corporation in section 16(b)
actions should have been finally laid at rest by the Second Circuit's
decision in Magida v. Continental Can Co."' There the sale complained of was made by the defendant, the majority stockholder of
the corporation, at the corporation's special request. The corporation
so requested because the defendant's majority stock ownership was
embarrassing the corporation in its sales efforts with competitors of
defendant, and the corporation was afraid that its stock would be
delisted by the exchange because of too few outstanding shares available for trading. As a result of this request the defendant sold a
large block of the corporation's stock, overlooking the fact that he
34203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953).
"The court relied in general on Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249
(1945), where the Supreme Court said at p. 257: "For no more than private contract
can estoppel be the means of successfully avoiding the requirements of legislation enacted
for the protection of a public interest." With particular reference to the Securities Act
the court relied on the district court decision in the Walet case, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E. D.
La. 1952), and upon Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), in which
latter case it was held that settlement of a claim for short-swing profits by the corporation was not a bar to a later suit instituted or prosecuted by a corporate shareholder
under § 16(b).
'e231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
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had purchased a much smaller block of stock within the previous six
months. The defendant denied liability on the grounds that he had
acted in good faith, had merely overlooked the earlier purchase, and
had not made use of inside information. The court, relying on Gratz
v. Claughton and Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., rejected those defenses,
and specifically rejected estoppel as a defense to section 16(b) action
under any circumstances, saying:
Since the policy of the statute is to protect minority stockholders and
the public against manipulated market fluctuations, certainly this
stockholder, who became such after the acts in question had taken place,
cannot be estopped by corporate acts, even those having the apparent
approval of a majority of stockholders. The action under Sec. 16(b)
is derivative in the sense that the corporation is the instrument, some
times unwilling, for the effectuation of the statutory policy; but this
so called derivative nature of the right, when coupled with the doctrine of estoppel, cannot serve to defeat the very policy it was created
to advance .

. .

. [W]e think that as a matter of law the lang-

uage and purpose of the statute preclude an estoppel based upon instigation by or benefit to the corporation whose shares are traded."

a. Immateriality of Plaintiff's Motives
Not only is the defendant's good faith immaterial, but it has now
been established that the plaintiff's motives in bringing suit are
equally immaterial. The right to sue (or intervene) is absolute. In
Magida v. Continental Can Co., where plaintiff bought his few
shares of stock after the transaction complained of in his petition and
did not present his stock for registration on the company's books
until after filing suit, and where defendant alleged that plaintiff's
sole motive in prosecuting the action was to obtain a fee for his
attorney, the Second Circuit upheld the district judge's refusal to
allow amendment of defendant's answer to include the defense of
champerty, saying:
But we think that, even if the proposed Fourth Defense [of champerty]
were fully capable of proof, it would be insufficient in law to defeat
the suit. The action is brought on behalf of the corporation to protect
the rights of stockholders and of the public. The relationship between
his attorney and the plaintiff who is the mere vehicle of recovery, cannot defeat the rights of the corporation and other stockholders, to
whom the recovery accrues."8
In Pellegrino v. Nesbit, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding the denial
Id. at 846, citing the Park & Tilford, Nesbit, and Walet cases.
as Id. at 848, citing Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204, 214 (1945),
37

tinental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78

(S.D.N.Y. 1951).

and Magida v. Con-
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of defendant's challenge to a motion by the holder of two shares of
the corporation's stock to intervene and prosecute the action, said:
The sufficiency of the interest appellant is seeking to protect is challenged by appellees. They have emphasized that since appellant averred
in his affidavit that he now owns but two shares of stock in the corporation an), recovery in behalf of the corporation will result in an exceedingly small recovery applicable to appellant's stock interest. We are
not convinced that this factor is significant. .

.

.In view of the statu-

tory policy involved we need not be concerned with either the substantiality of appellant's shareholder interest, see Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corporation v. Jenkins, or appellant's motive in seeking to
take part in the litigation."
To the same effect is Blau v. Ogsbury, holding that plaintiff's
motive for bringing a section 16 (a) suit is immaterial in view of the
legislative policy to curb short-term trading by insiders.
b. Beneficial Ownership "at the Time of the Purchase"
Section 16(b) provides that short-swing profits by the beneficial
owner of more than ten per cent of any class of a corporation's
equity securities are not covered by the section unless the beneficial
owner was such "both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the
sale and purchase, of the security involved."'" This wording posed the
important question as to whether the purchase by which the beneficial owner acquired an interest greater than ten per cent in a class
of equity security could be counted as the purchase in the "purchase
and sale" necessary to complete a transaction the profits from which
would be payable to the corporation under section 16 (b)." The SEC
apparently has always held the view that both the purchase in which
the ten per cent holding was acquired and the sale in which it was
divested would constitute parts of a transaction falling within the
coverage of section 16(b), " but the matter did not come before the
courts until 1952.
"'203 F.2d 463, 466 (1956), citing Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204 (1945), and
Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
"°CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90635 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 210
F.2d 426

(2d Cir. 1954).

" This limitation on coverage applies only to beneficial owners who are not also officers
or directors. It is obvious from the statute that a short-swing profit of an officer or
director is payable to the corporation if the person making the profit was an officer or
director
either at the time of the purchase or the time of the sale.
4
1See
Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 631.
43 Rule X-16B-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-2
(1949), adopted in 1935, purported to
exempt certain underwriting transactions from the scope of § 16(b). The exemption is
necessary only on the assumption that a person who acquired 10% of a class of equity
security by virtue of an underwriting agreement was otherwise within S 16(b) by virtue
of that acquisition.
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In Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp.," the Second Circuit held
that where the defendant acquired its ten per cent interest in the
corporation in one large transaction, sales by the defendant made
within six months thereafter were subject to the provisions of section 16(b), any profits from such sales being payable to the corporation."' Judge Hincks dissented on the ground that there is no ambiguity in the statutory language of "shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at

the time of the purchase and sale . .

. .""

Judge Hincks based his dis-

sent on two points:

(1) There is no room for "construction" of the statutory language, which plainly and unambiguously means that for a transaction to be covered, the beneficial owner must be such at the time
he makes the purchase and the time he makes the sale, not as a result
of making the purchase.

(2) The basic rationale of the Securities Exchange Act involves
the removal of the possibility of profit to one who deals in a corporation's stock on the basis of inside information; a person is conclusively presumed not to have access to inside information until after
he has become the owner of at least a ten per cent interest-therefore
the purchase by which he becomes a ten per cent beneficial owner
does not constitute a part of a prohibited transaction under section

16(b).
There is considerable merit in Judge Hincks' position. To "construe" the statutory wording in the manner adopted by the majority

appears to be the grossest type of unwarranted judicial legislation.
4232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
"The
court approved the holding of the trial judge, 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), that the defendant became the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the corporation's stock at the very moment when it purchased that stock. The trial judge said,
at p. 959: "If the construction urged by defendant is placed upon the exemption provision, it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out
until his ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then repeat the process, ad
infinitum. A construction such as this would provide a way for the evasion of Section
16(b) by principal stockholders, and render it largely ineffective to prevent some of
the financial evils which led to the passage of the legislation by Congress..... " The
trial judge went on to say, at p. 960, that the exemption provision was intended "to
exclude the second sale in a case where 10% is purchased, 5% sold within three months,
and the remaining $% a month later,' " quoting Seligman, "Problems Under The Securities Exchange Act," 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1934). In addition to approving the
trial judge's interpretation, the Second Circuit based its decision on its prior holding in
Blau v. Ogsbury that the exercise of an option which gave the optionee a 10% interest in the corporation constituted a "purchase," so that profits on sales of stock
within six months before or after the exercise of the option would be recoverable for
the corporation under § 16(b).
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 2, S 16(b), as quoted in Judge Hincks'
dissent, 232 F.2d 299, 303 (1956).
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The evil said to result from the adoption of Judge Hincks' view"' is
hardly removed by the adoption of the majority construction. It is
easy enough to acquire a large block of stock in two transactions,
rather than one, and thus to a great extent avoid the rule of the
Stella case.' 8
Although it seems likely that, as almost all section 16 (b) litigation
arises in New York, the majority opinion will prevail, ' the only
other court to consider the matter adopted Judge Hincks' reasoning.
This decision, Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stephens Inv.
Co.,"5 the only section 16(b) case ever to arise in the district court
for Arkansas, is entitled to serious consideration. It is (unlike many
of the district court decisions under section 16 (b) arising outside
New York"5 ) a well-reasoned opinion in harmony with the general
principles laid down in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. and following
cases. The other major holding of the Arkansas case is that a brokerdealer firm, the beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of a class
of equity security in the named gas company, was liable under section 16(b) for profits made in dealing in shares of the gas company
in the course of its regular investment business, even though it made
no use of inside information and made no sales out of the block of
stock (amounting to over ten percent of the total issued) which it
held for investment purposes.
c. Who is an "Officer"
In two recent cases concerning the important and troublesome
question of who is an "officer" subject to the rule of section 16(b),
the judges of the Southern District of California have rather clearly
demonstrated error in the position taken by the far more experienced
(in securities litigation) Second Circuit. In 1934, pursuant to its
'The

"evil" referred to is that set out in note 45, supra.

4It will be a comparatively rare case in which the acquisition of a block of stock

in a corporation having a security listed on a national exchange will be much greater
than 10%, and even in such cases, Judge Hincks' version of the rationale of the act
is more logical than that of the majority.
" Earlier reference has been made to the SEC's implied adoption of the theory of
the majority in the Stella case by virtue of the promulgation of Rule X-16B-2, 17
C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1949); the majority opinion noted that the SEC had adopted this
viewpoint expressly in a general counsel's opinion. 11 Fed. Reg. 10968 (1946). The SEC
also filed a brief as amicus curiae in the lower court in Stella, 104 F. Supp. 957
(1952), in support of what became the court's interpretation. 232 F.2d 299, 301 (1956).
' 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
" For examples of "maverick" decisions, see Consolidated Engineering Corp. v. Nesbit,
102 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd sub nom. Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463
(9th Cir. 1953); Dottenheim v. Murchison, 127 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd,
227 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956).
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rule making power under the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC
promulgated rule X-3B-2, providing:
The term 'officer' means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary,
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers."2

The SEC later interpreted this regulation as leading to the conclusion
that an assistant treasurer, an assistant secretary, and an assistant
comptroller are not officers unless their chief is so inactive as to thrust
the burden of the office upon them. 3 In Colby v. Klune,"4 the Second
Circuit expressed doubt as to the validity of the SEC's definition,
suggesting instead a subjective test which would include as an officer:
A corporate employee performing important executive duties of such
character that he would be likely, in discharging these duties, to obtain
confidential information about the company's affairs that would aid
him if he engaged in personal market transactions .... It is immaterial

how his functions are labeled or how defined in the by-laws, or that he
does or does not act under the supervision of some other corporate representative."5

After the Colby decision the SEC proposed, in 1952, to amend the
definition of "officer" in Rule X-3B-2 so as to include other corporate employees "performing important executive duties of such
character that they would be likely, in discharging their duties, to
obtain confidential information about their company's affairs." 5 This
proposed amendment was not adopted, primarily because of its uncertainty of application, and in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 7 the court disapproved the holding of Colby v. Klune, pointing
out that the "other person" provision of rule X-3B-2 "does not relate
to an employee who assists one of the enumerated officers or performs
any of the functions of his office during his absence, but relates to
an officer, regardless of title, the functions of whose office correspond
to those perfomed by one of the enumerated officers.""
5217

C.F.R. § 240.16b-2 (1949).

" Securities Exchange Act release No. 2687, November 16, 1940.
54 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
55
Id. at 873.
5'20
U.S.L. Week 2613 (June 24, 1952); see 106 F. Supp. at 814.
"7106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
sId. at 813. The Rathman case is additionally interesting in that the corporation
concerned had; prior to granting the option to its assistant treasurer to purchase the
stock in question, inquired of the SEC whether or not such assistant treasurer was an
"officer," and the SEC had ruled that he was not. The court pointed out at p. 814
that the fact situation fell within the purview of the last sentence of § 23(a), providing:
"No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission
or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, notwithstanding that such
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In Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell," a different judge of the
same district court which decided the Rathman case refused to adopt
either the subjective test of Colby v. Klune or the objective test of
Rathman. The judge thought that Colby went too far in stating that
it was immaterial to a decision on the question as to how the alleged
officer's functions were labeled or whether he acted under the supervision of some other corporate representative. On the other hand
the court felt that Rathman was too narrow, since:
It is conceivable that in a corporation like Lockheed, with complex
activities, two persons might perform the functions of treasurer, secretary, and comptroller, each doing, within a certain sphere of the
corporation's far-flung activities, exactly the same things."'
The court therefore inquired into the actual responsibilities of the
defendant's job, and finding that he had no concern with questions
of policy, held him not to be an officer within the meaning of section 16 (b). There the matter rests; from the standpoint of certainty
and practical administration there is a great deal to be said for the
Commission's early interpretation of rule X-3B-2, as approved in
Rathman. On the other hand, the holding of Campbell seems more
nearly to effectuate the purposes of the statute. Probably either the
Rathman or the Campbell rule would prove to be workable, while
the rule of Colby v. Klune would lead to unnecessary confusion.

d. Stocks of Different Classes
One other potentially troublesome question of coverage under section 16 (b) should be noted-whether a recovery is permissible by a
corporation under section 16(b) where stock of one class is purchased and stock of another class is sold."' This question, which con-

ceivably could raise tremendously complex questions of valuation, has
fortunately not plagued the courts. Mr. Loss has suggested that:
There are no ready answers, but the test (as to what securities are sufficiently identifiable so as to make the purchase of one and the sale of
rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded, or be
determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."

The court, recognizing the rule against estoppel of corporations, went on to say:
"This Court is not suggesting that plaintiff has in any way estopped itself from
enforcing the liability asserted because of its reliance on the S.E.C. Regulations in
the administration of its plan. The reliance of plaintiff on the Regulations is alluded
to only to emphasize defendant's own reliance on the S.E.C. rule, a reliance which
apparently was shared by plaintiff, itself."
It is interesting to speculate on how the court would have resolved this apparent conflict
between § 23(a) and the "no estoppel" rule, had it found it necessary to do so.
" 110 F. Supp.

282

(S.D. Cal. 1953).

60Id. at 284.
"s Cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., discussed above.
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the other a transaction within Section 16(b)) should presumably be
whether the securities may be so assimilated as to afford a means of
in-and-out trading profits derivable from use of inside information."
In Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc.6 3 the court, dealing with the
arbitrage exemption under section 16(d), indicated that convertible
stocks and bonds are of the same class as the security into which they
may be converted, saying:
It will readily be seen that for all practical purposes a convertible bond
is equivalent to the number of shares of stock into which it is convertible. A right or warrant plus the subscription price is theoretically
equivalent to the stock on which the right or warrant has a call."'
This seems to bear out Mr. Loss' statment."
II.

WHAT ARE "SALES"

AND "PURCHASES"

One of the most troublesome problems in section 16 (b) interpretation (and one still unresolved, at least insofar as the evolvement of
a general rule is concerned) is that of determining what are "sales"
and "purchases." The statute itself provides that the terms "buy"
and "purchase" include any contract to buy, purchase, or "otherwise
acquire," and the terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract
to sell "or otherwise dispose of."6 Such sketchy language has proved
to be of little help in determining whether acquisitions by virtue of
reorganizations, mergers, consolidations, and dissolutions constitute
"purchases," and the courts have been reluctant to construe the
statutory definition of "sales" as including such dispositions as gifts.
The first case directly on the point, Park &YTilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
involved the exercise by controlling stockholders of the privilege of
converting some of their preferred stock into common, and their
subsequent sale of the common within six months. The Second Circuit held" that the conversion of the preferred into common followed within six months by a sale of the common is a "purchase and
sale" within the meaning of section 16(b). The decision indicated
"2Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 578.
41208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953).
e4Id. at 603.
" Note Mr. Loss' further statement at p. 263 (1955

Supp.):

"Whatever the answer to the question whether convertible preferred and common
may be matched, logically the same answer should apply to the several securities
involved in a merger, consolidation, sale of assets, or reclassification after approval
and public announcement; for at that point the securities will tend to sell in substantially the same relation to each other as the ratios specified in the merger and
so on."
66 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 2, 5§ 3(a) (13) and 3(a) (14).
67Unanimously upon this point, although Judge Swan dissented on the method of
determining the purchase price, a point discussed later in this paper.
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an intent to give the broadest possible construction to the statutory
provisions that the definition of "sales" and "purchases" include
"any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire" and "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of," specifically holding that the
language "any contract to purchase, or otherwise acquire" necessarily
included completed acquisitions as well as executory contracts."s Like
so many other apparently hard and fast rules of construction, this
one was soon found to require many modifications.
In Truncale v. Blumberg, the defendant was issued valuable stock
warrants annually in accordance with the terms of his employment
contract. Within six months of receiving some of the warrants, he
gave them to various legitimate charities. Plaintiff stockholders
claimed, supported by an amicus curiae brief of the Securities Exchange Commission filed at Judge Medina's request, that the gifts
to charities were "sales." ' In spite of the all-inclusive phraseology
of section 3(a) (14)," the court refused to concede that a gift was
a "sale," explaining away Park &qTilford as follows:
Doubtless it was the intention of the Congress that the terms of Section 16(b) should cover any acquisition or disposal of the securities
which might reasonably be considered in the category of a 'purchase'
or a 'sale' in connection with which an insider might profit by the use
of confidential information to the detriment of the outside stockholders
and the corporation.
This is what I think was decided in the leading cases of Smolowe v.
Delendo Corporation . . . and Park & Tilford v. Schulte. . . . I find
that these gifts do not constitute 'sales' and that there was no profit.71

In Blau v. Hodgkinson72 the court held that the receipt of warrants
by a corporate officer under his contract of employment constituted
a purchase,73 and further held that receipt of stock in a parent corpo6" The court said: "Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion
is a 'purchase' is dispelled by the definition of 'purchase' to include 'any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire.' Section 3(a)(13). Defendants did not own the common stock in question before they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward.
Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the act." 160 F.2d 984,
987 (1947).
6" The plaintiff stockholder established the "profit" to be recovered by the corporation
as the amount of the economic benefit gained by the defendant through taking a deduction on his tax return for the market value of the warrants at the time of the gift.
The SEC brief did not support this position, and the court expressed itself as being
offended by the plaintiff's characterization of defendant's gifts to the charities as a
'"tax dodge."
0""The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
71 80 F. Supp. 387, 391-92
(1948). The court said, however, by way of dictum, that
the acquisition of the warrants by the defendant at the time of their actual issuance to
him did constitute purchases within the meaning of § 16(b).
72 100 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
7 But restricted the repayment for which the corporate officer was liable after sale
of securities acquired on exercise of the option to the difference between the proceeds
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ration in exchange for stock in a subsidiary pursuant to a plan of
reorganization, constituted a "purchase," where the insider had an
option to dissent from the plan and to receive cash instead. The
opinion clearly indicated that the exchange would probably not have
been considered a "purchase" within the meaning of section 16(b)
had the insider been obligated to accept the stock of the parent by
virtue of the reorganization.""
The broad implications of the Park &qTilford case (that all acquisitions are "purchases" and that all dispositions are "sales") were
further narrowed by the Second Circuit in Shaw v. Dreyfus, where
a distinction was drawn between the receipt of warrants by a corporate officer pursuant to his contract of employment (held taxable in
Blau v. Hodgkinson) and the receipt of warrants issued pro rata to
all common stockholders of record. In refusing to hold the latter
type of receipt to be a "purchase," the court said:
"Inside" information which the directors may have cannot possibly be
used to the detriment of other stockholders in voting to grant rights
to all stockholders of record in proportion to their existing holdings.
. . . "Purchase" is not an apt word to describe the receipt by a stockholder of shares representing a stock dividend or of warrants representing his pre-emptive right to subscribe for new shares. Nor will
the purpose of the Statute be defeated by refusing so unusual a meaning to the word."
The court also affirmed the holding of Truncale v. Blumberg that a

gift, although obviously a disposition, is not a "sale" within the
meaning of section 16(b)."7
The nice distinctions involved in determining what are and are not
"sales" and "purchases" are well illustrated by Blau v. Mission Corp.7
In 1948, the Mission Corporation, pursuant to a plan to gain control of Tidewater Oil Company, had acquired almost one and onehalf million shares of Tidewater's common stock, more than ten per
cent of the total. Mission organized a subsidiary and transferred its
block of Tidewater stock to the subsidiary in return for the subsidiary's shares, at the ratio of two shares of the subsidiary for one
share of Tidewater. Mission continued to purchase Tidewater shares,
of the sale and the lowest market price of such security within the six-month period
preceding and the same period succeeding the date of sale, in accordance with rule
X-16B-6, 17 C.F.R. § 16b-6 (1949). For a further discussion of this rule, see the
section "Administrative Exemptions," infra.
74100
F. Supp. 361, 373 (1948).
75172
F.2d 140 (1949).
7o Judge Clark dissented on both holdings, apparently believing that the broad definitions of "sale" and "purchase" contained in the Securities Exchange Act should be
construed to include literally all types of acquisition and disposition.
77212.
F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 1016 (1954).
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and by 1951 it owned an additional one million shares, which it then
transferred to the subsidiary at the same two-for-one ratio. Between
the time of the two transfers by Mission Corporation to the subsidiary of Tidewater, Mission had distributed some of the subsidiary's shares as dividends to Mission's stockholders, reducing Mission's ownership of the subsidiary to sixty per cent. The subsidiary's
stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and though its
intrinsic value was absolutely tied to the underlying Tidewater stock
constituting substantially all of its assets, its stock sold at a discount.
The Second Circuit held that the first exchange of Tidewater
stock for stock of the subsidiary was not a sale within section 16 (b),
but that the second exchange was, distinguishing the two by the
following reasoning: The first transaction was a mere transfer between corporate pockets. "To hold otherwise would be to place entirely undue stress on the corporate fiction reaching harsh and
wooden results quite unnecessary to achieve the purposes of the act."" s
At the time of the second exchange Mission still owned sixty per
cent of the subsidiary's stock and thus had obviously not relinquished
actual control of the subsidiary's block of Tidewater stock. Nor did
Mission alter its beneficial interest in the Tidewater stock, since the
second exchange with the subsidiary was at the same two-for-one
ratio as the first. It is conceded that the second exchange did not give
rise to a gain for tax purposes," and the SEC had, after due consideration and full disclosure, approved both exchanges by granting
exemptions from the provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940 prohibiting inter-affiliate transactions. Nevertheless, since the
second exchange did not constitute merely a transfer between corporate pockets (Mission owning only sixty per cent of the subsidiary's
stock) and since the subsidiary's stock received by Mission on the
second exchange was readily salable and of independent market
value, the second exchange constituted a "sale" by Mission of the
Tidewater stock, profits received by Mission being payable to Tidewater under section 16(b).
The court re-enforced its reasoning by pointing out that:
...[I]f Mission were to receive stock in an exchange such as this, and
thereafter sell it within six months, we have no doubt that the ex11Id.

at 80.
79int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b)(5)
(now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351), provides for the non-recognition of gain or loss where property is transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for stock, and immediately after the exchange the transferor is
in control of the corporation. The court held that Mission was clearly an "insider"
since, by virtue of its absolute control of the subsidiary corporation, it was indirectly
the owner of all the Tidewater stock held by the subsidiary. Section 16(a), Securities
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(b) [under Park & Til-

The defendant of course argued that there could be no "sale" since
its commitment in Tidewater stock had in no way been reduced by
the exchange. The court attempted to meet this by saying:
...[R]educed or not, the ownership has been one step removed and
the intervening [subsidiary's] stock is independently valuable. It is
not beyond conceit that an insider would possess information which
when publicly released would depress Tidewater prices while enhancing those of [the subsidiary]. . .. "

Two weeks after handing down its decision in Blau v. Mission
Corp., the Second Circuit heard argument in Roberts v. Eaton." The
defendants were a family group owning 45.9 per cent of the outstanding common stock of Old Town Corporation. Deciding to
divest themselves of their interest in the corporation, they proposed,
and obtained stockholder approval of, a re-classification of the outstanding $5 par value common stock into an equal number of shares
of $1 par value common and a similar number of shares of cumulative preferred stock. Shortly after the stockholders' meeting authorizing the re-classification of the common and the issue of the new
cumulative preferred, the defendants simultaneously sold their common stock to an individual and their preferred stock to two life insurance companies and an investment company. Plaintiff stockholders
contended that the defendants' receipt of the re-classified stock was
a "purchase" within section 16(b), and that their profits on the sale
of the new common and cumulative preferred were recoverable for
the corporation.
For the first time the Second Circuit attempted to decide this issue
by matching the facts against all prior decisions dealing with "sales"
and "purchases," declining the "enunciation of a black-letter rubric,"
but concluding that the receipt by the defendants of the reclassified
common and the new cumulative preferred did not constitute a
"'purchase" within section 16(b). The court relied on the following
factors, said to distinguish the instant case from previous cases in
which "sales" and "purchases" had been found: (1) The reclassification of the common and issue of the new cumulative preferred afExchange Act of 1934, defines an insider as "every person who is directly or indirectly
the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class of any equity security ....
.
"°212 F.2d 77, 81 (1954).

" Id. at 81. The last sentence of the quotation may be true, but it is difficult to
conceive of what such information would consist.
822 12 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
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fected all stockholders equally. (2) The stocks received as a result
of the reclassification were without pre-existing market value. (3)
After the reclassification, the defendants continued their interest in
the corporation, with no change in their proportionate interests.
Conceding that the enumerated distinctions had each been strongly
challenged, the court said:
As a matter of fact it seems quite possible that no one of the factors
we have enumerated, standing alone, would be sufficient for that result
[to immunize the transaction from application of Section 16 (b)] but
in cumulative effect we think that they are. The reclassification at bar
could not possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section 16 (b). This being so, it was not a "purchase" and the decision below was correct."3
The court was wise in not renewing the attempt of the old Park
L Tilford case to set down a firm rule to cover all transactions. Considerably more litigation will be necessary before the effects of section 16(b) on given types of corporate organizations, reorganizations, and dissolutions can be predicted without chance of error."

The latest reported section 16(b) decision, Blau v. Albert,"'
further illustrates the complex problems involved in determining
what constitute "sales" and "purchases." Defendant, the beneficial
owner of more than ten per cent of Bellanca Corporation's equity
securities, purchased over 1,000,000 shares of Bellanca stock and

within six months allegedly sold 50,500 of such shares at a profit.
Defendant, on motion for summary judgment, contended that the
disposition of the 50,500 shares was not a "sale," since (1) 23,500

shares were transferred to individuals as compensation for services
rendered in connection with the purchase of the million-plus share

block, and there was, therefore, either no profit on the disposition of
a Id. at 86. Texas lawyers may find this technique and reasoning interestingly similar
to Judge Brewster's in the well-known case of Smerke v. Office Equipment Co., 138
Tex. 236, 158 S.W.2d 302 (1941), holding that while no one of several instances of
improper jury argument might require reversal of a judgment in favor of the party so
arguing, all the incidents complained of, taken together, required such reversal.
There is also an analogy to the well-known principle of federal income tax law
that a series of transactions which taken separately will produce one result, may, when
considered as integral parts of one over-all plan, produce an opposite result. For example, see Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). In the latter case, however, the doctrine always works for the government, and
never in favor of an individual, as in the Eaton case.
" In both Roberts v. Eaton and Blau v. Mission Corp. the SEC declined the court's
request to file an amicus curiae brief. The court announced its regret, but in view of
the delicate nature of the problem and the tendency of administrative agencies to
argue in favor of maximum coverage, it is hard to share the court's sorrow, particularly
since the Second Circuit has itself of necessity developed competence in the field. Probably the majority of attorneys and laymen prefer interpretation by courts rather than
administrative agencies wherever practicable.
sSCCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90836 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1957).
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the shares, or there was no sale of the shares since the defendant had
initially acquired them merely on behalf of the persons entitled to
such compensation; and (2) the remaining 27,000 shares were disposed of by gift and not by sale. As to the 23,500 shares delivered as
commissions, the court held that such deliveries would constitute
"sales," whether they were treated as being in payment for a preexisting debt (i.e., a debt for commissions) or as a brokerage transaction in which the defendant originally acquired such stock merely
on behalf of the ultimate recipients.
As to the 27,000 shares claimed to have been disposed of by gift,
the court noted that the defendant had filed reports with the SEC
under section 16(a) in which the transfer of these shares was indicated as "sales made privately for investment" and that there was
enough question as to the alleged charitable donation being a subterfuge that the issue must be determined on a trial.

III. THE

NATURE AND MEASURE OF RECOVERABLE "PROFITS"

As noted above, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., the first case to arise
under section 16(b), established the principle that recoverable
"profits" are measured by matching the insider's lowest-cost purchases against his highest-prices sales during any six month period."
The court rejected the basic income tax rule of identification of stock
certificates, both because it would allow the large stockholder to speculate with impunity merely by reason of having a reserve of stock
and carefully choosing his stock certificates for delivery so as never
to make a sale of a certificate purchased less than six months before,
and for the futher reason that the "identification" rule would be
almost impossible to apply in cases where the sale part of the transaction preceded the purchase. The court similarly rejected the "firstin, first-out" rule, and, since the statute itself provides for the recovery of "any" profit realized, precluded any setting off of losses
against gains. The court said:
The only rule whereby all possible profits can be surely recovered is
that of lowest price in, highest price out- within six months- as
applied by the District Court. We affirm it here, defendants having
failed to suggest another more reasonable rule."
This holding was reaffirmed in Gratz v. Claughton and has not been
questioned since. In Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, there was presented an unusual situation involving apparent manipulation by the
" See note 27 supra and accompanying
87 136 F.2d 231, 239 (1943).

text.
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insiders (who controlled the corporation) producing an unrealistic
discrepancy between the value of preferred stock and the value of
the common stock into which the preferred was convertible. The
court held that the cost basis to the insider (of stock later sold at a
profit) is determined by the value of the assets delivered by him in
the original exchange for the stock, and not by the value of the stock
received in the exchange and later sold.
Where options or warrants are acquired incident to a contract of
employment and not for a cash consideration, and are subsequently
sold, the "profit" is measured by the difference between the sales
price and the value of the option at the date of its accrual."' And the
value of the option is established merely by taking the difference between the exercise price and the market value of the stock underlying the option."s Where the option is exercised and the stock later
sold, the date of the "purchase" is the date of exercise and not the
date upon which payment is finally made pursuant to such exercise."
The cost basis is nevertheless the option price plus the value of the
option, not on the date of exercise, or the date of payment pursuant
to the exercise, but on the date of accrual of the option right."' (The
entirely different treatment of transactions on stock acquired pursuant to the exercise of options under a bonus profit-sharing, retirement, stock option, thrift, savings, or similar plan meeting certain
specified requirements is discussed in the section on "Administrative
Exemptions," infra.)
The Park & Tilford rule that the cost basis for determining profits
on securities acquired and later sold within six months is the value of
what the insider gave in exchange for the stock and not the market
"Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 190 F.2d
82 (2d Cir. 1951); Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per
curiam sub noma.Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
"Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
9"Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d (2d Cir. 1953). In 1941, as part of his agreement
of employment, the corporate president was given an unassignable option to purchase
company stock at a fixed price per share. In 1945, the president gave notice of his
election to purchase the shares under the option, which action clearly obligated him
to pay the purchase price. However, he postponed payment until December 8, 1948,
and shortly thereafter received his stock. Within six months prior to the December 8,
1948 payment, the president had sold 600 shares of identical stock at a price greatly
in excess of the option price on the stock purchased under the employment agreement.
Against plaintiff's contention that the "purchase" occurred when the option stock was
paid for, the court held that the "purchase" occurred, not at the time of payment,
but on the date over three years earlier on which the defendant became irrevocably
liable for the purchase price. Since there were no other transactions involved, 5 16(b)
was held not applicable.
1
" Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95
F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In these cases the amount of recovery is often mitigated
by rule X-16B-6, discussed in text infra.
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value at the time of the purchase of the stock purchased has been recently applied in Blau v. Lamb" and in Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., the latter case involving a complex fact situation in

which the insider had exchanged a miscellaneous collection of tangible and intangible assets for stock and other items.
In the Park & Tilford case the defendant was held liable for repayment to his corporation of larger profits than he otherwise would
have made, by application of the rule that the cost basis for determining the profits realized is fixed by the value of the assets which the in-

sider transfers for his corporation's stock in the purchase part of the
transaction, rather than the value of the stock received in the purchase. In Blau v. Mission Corp., discussed above, the "purchase" part
of the transaction involved cash, but the "sale" part involved the exchange by the insider of his corporation's stock for stock in another
company, where the stock "sold" had a market value higher than
that of the stock received. The plaintiff attempted to apply the Park
& Tilford rule to compute defendant's liability, but the court refused
to do so, holding that, whereas the purchase price must be determined
by looking to the consideration parted with, the sale price is the consideration received, not the different value (higher or lower) of the
stock sold.'
The recent case of Blau v. Albert involved a purchase of a large
amount of stock by an insider and a subsequent transfer by him of a
portion of the stock in payment for services rendered in connection
with his acquisitions. The precise fact situation does not appear, since
the reported decision is on a motion for summary judgement, but the
court stated its belief that, it appearing that the insider and the transferees contemplated that compensation for the value of the services
rendered to the insider would be partially defrayed by an anticipated
rise in the value of the shares transferred, the defendant should be
held accountable for profits to the same extent as if he had sold the
stock on the open market for an amount representing the increased
market value. While it is not entirely clear, the court apparently is
merely saying that the value received on the "sale" is determined by
the value of the stock transferred at the time of the transfer - a
result in line with prior authority.
'220 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" In the assets-for-stock-and-other-assets exchange between Graham-Paige Motors and
Kaiser-Frazer, both parties were forced by economic realities to enter into the transaction,
and Kaiser-Frazer was the only possible purchaser for the Graham-Paige assets. The
court refused to apply the usual "fair market value" test since neither Graham-Paige
nor Kaiser-Frazer could be classified as a "willing buyer" or "willing seller."
94212 F.2d 77, 81
(1954).
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Although the courts uniformly follow the Smolowe dictum that
"the statute was intended to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard
so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a
fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder, and the faithful performance of his duty,"" it has become well-established that the insider is
liable for payment of "net" profits only, after deduction of at least
commissions and transfer taxes incident to the transactions." Blau v.
Mission Corp., dealing with the calculation of profits following private transactions, makes it clear that only expenses actually incurred
may be deducted, the court saying:
* * * [E]xpenses are those actually incurred, and not mere possibilities
such as might have been incurred had equivalent stock been sold in the
market. .. ."

The Arkansas-LouisianaGas Co. case probably went much too far
in allowing set-off expenses, although the court can hardly be blamed
for a sympathetic attitude. The defendant investment company
owned, for investment purposes, a large block of Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Company stock. It did not dispose of any of its investment shares,
but over a period of time, in response to many requests from customers and citizens of its community, it devoted a great deal of time
to trading in the gas company's shares in the course of its regular
business as an investment dealer and broker. The court found that
the investment company's transactions in gas company stock consumed at least one-fourth of the time of defendant's employees during the period and allowed, as set-off expenses against the gas company's recovery, not only the direct expenses of transfer taxes, insurance and bank charges, but also one-fourth of defendant's general
overhead, office rent, salaries, and automobile expenses." It seems
doubtful that the liberality of the Arkansas court will be matched by
New York courts when the question arises.
In the Smolowe case no mention was made of the possible recovery
of interest by the corporation from the insider since the date of the
insider's profit, and apparently none was allowed. However, the Sec95136 F.2d 231, 239 (1943).
" Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 1016 (1954);
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas. Co. v. W. R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark.
1956); Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., unreported S.D.N.Y. 1953, rev'd on other
grounds, 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953).
" On motion for rehearing, 212 F.2d 77, 82 (1954).
"SThe court, however, disallowed claimed offsets for salesmen's salaries, travel, and
entertainment expenses, since no sales campaign was made to sell the stock in question.
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ond Circuit, in Blau v. Mission Corp., in issuing directions to the
lower court as to proceedings on remand, said:
[A]ny award, if made, should bear interest from the time of sale."
Similar directions on remand were given by the Second Circuit in
Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp. In Magida v. Continental Can
Co., the same court, although upholding the trial court's award of
interest from the date of realization of the profit, pointed out that
such allowance of interest is not mandatory. This qualification is
somewhat surprising, since certainly the use of the money by the insider from the time of realization of the profit until he is forced to
give it up is of benefit to him, and the allowance of interest would
seem to be required to comply with the Smolowe "squeeze out all the
profits" doctrine."'
In Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., where the insider sold securities having dividend rights and simultaneously purchased an equal
number of shares of the same securities without dividend rights, the
trial court held that the sale and purchase fell within section 16(b)
but, adopting the position taken by the SEC in its amicus curiae
memorandum, deducted from the recoverable "profits" the amount
of dividends which the defendant would have received if it had kept
its original stock, leaving defendant with only a nominal liability.
While this decision was reversed on appeal, on the grounds that the
transaction was entirely exempt as a bona fide arbitrage, the allowance
of a set-off for the amount of dividends which the insider would have
received during the interval between the sale and purchase is only
fair. In the converse case of a purchase followed by a sale, the dividends received by the insider in the interim should be added to the
recoverable profits.1"'
Prior to 1952 the SEC had permitted a partner to report, under
section 16(a), either all partnership transactions in stock of a company of which the partner was an insider or only his partnership
share, taking the position that section 16(b) would apply only to
the insider partner's share of short-swing profits made by the partnership. But in Rattner v. Lehman"' the Second Circuit, although imposing liability only for the insider partner's share of partnership
profits from dealing in shares of a corporation of which the partner
was a director, indicated that under certain circumstances the insider
99 212 F.2d 77, 82 (1954) (on motion for rehearing).
...The Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. case similarly made no mention of interest
apparently allowed none.
1"1See Loss, Securities Regulation 258 (1955 Supp.).
102 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).

and
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partner might be liable for his partnership's entire profit. Subsequent
cases have without discussion imposed liability on the insider partner3
in similar situations only to the extent of his partnership interest,"
but in these cases there was no question of actual use of inside information, and the question is left open as to whether a corporate insider whose partnership profits from the use of such information may
be liable for the full amount of the partnership profits."4

IV.

EXEMPTIONS

a. Statutory Exemptions
By its terms section 16 does not apply to insider's short-swing
profits from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of:
(1) An exempted security;-, s
(2) Securities acquired by the insider in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted;
(3) Transactions where the beneficial owner (but not an officer
or director) was not such beneficial owner both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved;
(4) "Any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection; ' ' °O and
(5) Foreign or domestic arbitrage transactions, unless made in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
adopt.
I

There has been comparatively little litigation dealing with the

"statutory exemptions," as differentiated from the administrative
exemptions pursuant to the Commission's rules. The limited scope of
the exemption for a security "acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted" was indicated in Smolowe v.
13 Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D.
Ark. 1956); Marks v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464 (1956).
.04See Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 402-05, 628-29.

'°3Section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "exempted securities" to include securities of or guaranteed by the United States, a state, or any
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any of them; securities
of corporations in which the United States has an interest, if designated for exemption
by the Secretary of the Treasury; and "such other securities . . . as the Commission
may, by such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate . . . exempt
from the operation of any one or more provisions of this title ....
" Since § 16(b)
by its terms applies only to "equity securities," neither United States nor other political
subdivision obligations are concerned in § 16(b) enforcement, and § 3(a) (12) is therefore important to the law of insiders' short-swing liability only because of the quoted
portion, allowing the Commission to make exemptions.
'0 Since the power of the Commission to adopt rules under S 3 has been broadly
construed, nearly all of the exemptive rules adopted by the Commission under the
authority of § 16 also refer to § 3(a) (12). Loss, Securities Regulation 482 (1951). Also
see Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 389.
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Delendo Corp., where one of the defendants paid a debt owing to
another in stock of a corporation in which they were both insiders.
The exemption of subsection (2) above was held to cover the stock
in the hands of the person who received it in payment of the other's
debt, but not to cover the transfer insofar as the person paying the
debt by means of such transfer was concerned. The court said:
The language of the exemption, however, does not naturally cover this
situation, and there is no reason in policy why it should. It would mean
that profits could be washed out by the simple expedient of borrowing
money to be repaid in stock.1' 7
In its next case under section 16 (b), Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
the Second Circuit refused to apply the "previously-contracted debt"
exemption to the acquisition of common stock on a voluntary surrender of convertible preferred, saying:
Ownership of preferred or common stock creates an equity interest,
and not a creditor's interest, under these circumstances. 0"
And in Truncale v. Blumberg, the court rejected the contention that
acquisition of stock by virtue of the exercise of an option or warrant
given in connection with an employment contract constituted an
acquisition "in connection with a debt previously contracted.""'
Of course, the statute in effect exempts, through non-coverage,
transactions where the purchase and sale are more than six months
apart, and exempts, through its limitations provision, transactions
where suit is not brought within two years of realization of the profit.
These "exemptions" are dealt with under the sections on "Coverage,"
supra, and "Enforcement," infra.

b. Administrative Exemptions
Athough section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act is phrased in
terms of absolute liability, it was designed to perform the definite,
limited function of curbing profits obtained by the misuse of information for personal benefit by persons and corporations in the position of "trustees" for all the stockholders, and to curb only shortswing profits at that. The Securities Exchange Commission was,
therefore, given the power to act by rules of general applicability to
exempt from the interdictions of the statute certain transactions
which were not subject to the evils intended to be cured."'
107 136 F.2d 231, 239 (1943); accord, Blau v. Albert, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para.
90836 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1957).
1o160 F.2d 984, 987 (1947).
0'80 F. Supp. 387, 392 (1948).
See Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 633.

195 8]

INSIDERS' LIABILITIES

Rule X- 16A-4... exempts securities held by executors, administrators, guardians, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, and other persons "duly authorized by law to administer the estate or assets of
other persons" for the twelve-month period following the appointment or qualification of such holder. The rule as first adopted exempted securities held in the estate of a deceased person for a period
of two years. Under the old wording, the contention was made that
shares of stock acquired from an estate which had held them two
years were exempt securities in the hands of all subsequent holders."'
The rule was therefore amended in 1952 to make clear that the
securities themselves are not exempt, but merely transactions by the
enumerated class of administrators during the twelve months following their qualification.
Rule X-16A-5 exempts securities purchased or sold by an oddlot dealer to the extent reasonably necessary to enable him to carry
on his regular odd-lot brokerage business. Rule X-16A-9 exempts
certain acquisitions of securities where there is no disposition by the
acquirer, otherwise than by way of gift, of securities of the same
class within six months, and the person acquiring such securities does
not otherwise deal in securities of the same class having a market
value in excess of $3,000.00 during any six month period in which
the acquisition occurs; it also excludes acquisitions and dispositions
of securities by way of gift where the total amount of gifts does not
exceed $3,000.00 for any six month period.
Rule X-16B-1 exempts transactions by registered investment
companies which have been exempted by the SEC from section
17(a) of the Investment Company Act, presumably on the ground
that the commission would satisfy itself that there was no question
of abuse of inside information before granting the exemption under
the Investment Company Act. Rule X-161B-4 is a similar provision
with reference to approved transactions under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935.
Rule X-16B-2 exempts underwriting transactions provided that at
least one person or firm who is not an insider is a participant in the
underwriting on equally favorable terms and to an equal extent with
the underwriting insider.
Rule X-16B-5 affords relief in the specialized situation where officers and directors of a corporation hold shares in an investment
...17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-4 (1949). In this and in other citations of SEC rules under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the rule number corresponds with the number to the
right of the decimal point in 17 C.F.R. 5§ 240.0-1 to 240.24b-3 (1949).
"'Magida v. Continental Can Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. paris. 90515, 90520, and
90521 (S.D.N.Y. 1951, 1952).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

company the sole assets of which consist of stock in the employer
corporation. The rule provides that a redemption of the shares of
the investment company does not constitute a purchase so as to make
profits on the sale of the employer company's stock within six
months of the redemption recoverable by the employer company
under section 16(b). 3
Rule X-16B-7 exempts transactions in connection with mergers
or consolidations which do not result in any significant change (less
than fifteen per cent) in the character or structure of the company.
Section 16(d) of the Securities Exchange Act exempts arbitrage
transactions except insofar as the Commission may limit the exemption. The Commission has promulgated rule X-16D-1, requiring
arbitrage profits realized by officers and directors (but not by beneficial owners as such) to be turned over to the issuer. The scope of
the statutory exemption and of rule X-16D-1 were considered in
Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc. The Foundation held more than
ten per cent of Pittsburgh Steel Company's Class A Preferred Stock.
On January 8, 1951, Pittsburgh declared a $25 dividend on this
stock to partially cover accumulated arrearages. On the record date
the Foundation sold 2,000 shares bearing the right to receive the
dividend and simultaneously purchased 2,000 shares without the
right. The next month the procedure was repeated when another
arrearage dividend was declared." 4 The court held that the transactions in question were exempt under section 16(d) and under rule
X-16D-1.113 A bona fide arbitrage transaction was found, with (1)
fixed relative values of convertible securities, with fluctuating relative prices; (2) a continuity of the arbitrager's position in the affected subject matter, remaining constant throughout the offsetting
transactions; and (3) a simultaneous purchase and sale. The court
pointed out that:
The very factors which indentify arbitrage effectively insulate it from
any wrongful use of inside knowledge .... Indeed arbitrage is so clearly
divorced from the abuses which Section 16(b) seeks to prevent, that
an implied exception could be urged with some force even absent the
express provisions of Section 16 (d)."'
' See Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 636.
114By this procedure the Foundation in effect received the arrearage dividends in the

form of capital rather than income. This apparently did not benefit the Foundation under
the income tax laws, since it seems to have been tax-exempt, but it did allow the Foundation to facilitate the completion of certain charitable donations from its principal to
which it was committed.
...
The lower court had held that the transactions were not exempt, but, giving the
Foundation credit for the amount of dividends which it would have received had it
kept its original stock, reached a result imposing a negligible liability.
11208 F.2d 600, 604 (1953).
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The court refused to import into the statute any requirement of an
intent to profit by a price spread.
The Falco case leaves unanswered two questions: how nearly
simultaneous the offsetting purchase and sale must be to constitute
a bona fide arbitrage, and whether incidental profits obtained by
virtue of fluctuations of the market are exempt under the statute
and rule. It does indicate that absolutely simultaneous purchases
and sales are not required. ' Before suit the Foundation had paid
over to Pittsburgh its incidental profits received by virtue of fluctuations of the market in the amount of $14,258.59. The court did
not pass upon the propriety of this payment, but in the usual case
the receipt of what were to the Foundation in this instance "incidental profits" is the very purpose of engaging in the arbitrage, and
the Falco case appears to constitute authority for their exemption.
Two exemptive rules of the Commission have run into trouble
in the Second Circuit, the latest under circumstances which seriously
threaten the right of the Commission to make any exemptions whatsoever, in spite of the specific statutory authority to do so; in any
event, it is now exceedingly dangerous for anyone to rely upon an
exemptive rule in spite of the provisions of section 23 (a).".
The first to come under attack was rule X-16B-6, promulgated
by the Commission in 1950, exempting that portion of the profits
realized from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of an
equity security acquired pursuant to the exercise of an option or
warrant, attributable to increment in value occuring more than six
months before or after the date of sale, provided that the option or
similar right was acquired more than six months before its exercise
or pursuant to the terms of an employment contract entered into
more than six months before its exercise. The rule was announced
as effective retroactively.
Blau v. Hodgkinson upheld both the Commission's right to promulgate rule X-16B-6 and its right to give the rule retroactive ef11 Id. at 603, n. 2. Compare Cook and Feldman, supra note 21, at 391: "A purchase
at the close of the New York market and a sale two hours later in San Francisco would
not meet the requirement of bona fides."
11 Section 23 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act reads as follows:
"The Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall
each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in them by this title, and may for such purpose
classify issuers, securities, exchanges, and other persons or matters within their respective jurisdictions. No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation
of the Commission or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended
or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any
reason."
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fect. But in Rattner v. Lehman, the Second Circuit, by way of dictum, stated that rule X-16B-6 (providing for an exemption of a
portion of profits realized from short-swing trading) was beyond
the Commission's authority, saying:
The Commission may exempt 'transactions'; but it cannot reduce the
liability imposed by section 16(b)."'
This dictum appears improper. Such an interpretation would force
the Commission, whatever the circumstances of a requested exemption, to choose between exempting a transaction entirely or denying
the exemption entirely. Having to make such a choice would force
the Commission to perpetrate injustices upon individuals, or to extend exemptions beyond the statutory policy in order to avoid such
injustices. Rule X-16B-6 remains in the books.
Rule X-16B-3 exempts the acquisition (but not the sale) of nontransferable options or of shares of stock, including stock acquired
pursuant to such options, by a director or officer (presumably,
whether or not also a ten per cent owner), where such stock or
option was acquired pursuant to a bonus, profit-sharing, retirement,
stock option, thrift, savings, or similar plan; provided that such
plan must have been specifically approved by at least a majority of
the stockholders, and must effectively limit the aggregate amount
of funds or securities which may be allocated thereunder. As originally passed as a rule of general applicability,' the rule exempted
only securities acquired "pursuant to a bonus, profit-sharing or other
similar plan" meeting the conditions set forth. It did not apply to
exempt stock options or stock acquired pursuant to such options.
As a result of congressional enactment in 1950 of what is now
section 421, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, providing favorable
tax treatment for restricted stock options, the Commission amended
and broadened rule X-16B-3, with effective date of November 1,
1
1952, to include restricted stock option plans."' But, apparently
trying to keep the rule as general as possible, the Commission's
amendment did not specifically refer to restricted stock options, and
it was therefore necessary to issue a large number of rulings on individual plans. On May 21, 1956, the Commission adopted an
amendment specifically including stock option plans, clarifying the
previous ambiguity.""
...193 F.2d 564, 566 (1952).
.. Rule X-16B-3 was first promulgated in 1935, but by its terms applied only to
options granted prior to June 7, 1934.
...17 Fed. Reg. 10388 (1952). For a discussion of the purposes of the 1952 amendment, see Greene v. Dietz, 143 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
122Securities Exchange Act Release, 21 Fed. Reg. 3647 (1956).
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Rule X-16B-3 came under judicial scrutiny in Greene v. Dietz.""
The defendant insiders held, pursuant to a restricted stock option
plan, options to acquire company stock at a fixed price. More than
six months after the option accrued, they exercised the options, and
within six months thereafter sold other shares of the same stock at a
price in excess of the amounts paid by them for their option stock.
The defendants had made no purchases of company stock within
six months before or after the sales complained of, except to the extent that exercising their previously-granted options should be considered a purchase. The court held that these transactions did not
come within the scope of section 16(b), since the Commission's
1952 amendment to rule X-16B-3 was a valid exercise of discretion
and therefore effectively exempted the transactions under consideration. In reaching. this result, the court relied upon (1) the Commission's administrative interpretation of the rule,"'4 and (2) the
reliance by the parties concerned on a specific ruling by the SEC that
their acquisitions under the stock option plan would be exempt from
section 16(b).
The Second Circuit affirmed,"' s but only on the ground that the
record clearly showed that the defendants had in good faith relied
on rule X-16B-3 as exempting their transactions and were thus
entitled to the protection of section 23 (a).'26
While not necessary to the decision, the majority took the occasion
of denying the power of the Commission to promulgate rule
X-16B-3 at all, "inasmuch as the rule's broad language may permit
acts by insiders sought to be prevented by the Securities Exchange
Act." Judge Lumbard strongly dissented on the grounds that (1)
the SEC's conclusion that there was little, if any, danger that ex143 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
124 The rule as then phrased did not specifically refer to stock acquired under stock
option plans, but the Commission consistently interpreted it so to apply. As noted in the
text, the 1956 amendment specifically included stock acquired under such plans. Note
the suggestion in Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361, 373 (1951), that the "crushing
liabilities" imposed in the judgment affirmed in Gratz v. Claughton may have led to
the adoption of rule X-16B-3 and to the Commission's giving it a broad interpretation
and retroactive effect.
1. 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
120Section 23(a) is quoted in full in note 118, supra. Even in this holding, the court
took pains to point out that the defendants would not have been excused from the coverage of the short-swing trading provisions if they had merely relied on the Commission's interpretative opinion which had been obtained by their company with reference
to the particular stock which defendants acquired under the stock option plan. The
court said, id. at 695:
"We emphasize that the defendants' exculpatory reliance was on the rule itself, not
merely on the interpretative opinion embodied in the letter from the Assistant Director of the S.E.C. That letter was only one link in a chain of circumstances evidencing the defendants' good faith reliance on a valid construction of Rule X-16B-3."
523
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empting acquisitions of stock under certain restricted plans would

violate the broad congressional purpose of preventing unfair use of
competition was entitled to support, "unless and until there is a
clear showing that the Commission has opened a door which Congress meant to keep shut," and (2) at the very least the Commission's expert judgment is entitled to the benefit of any doubt on
matters which Congress confided to the Commission's regulation.
The majority opinion, in answer to the points raised by the dissent,
refused to regard the promulgation of rule X-16B-3 as a matter
solely within the expertise of the SEC, stating:
Rather, the question is one of interpreting the Securities Exchange Act
in order to ascertain whether the Rule was a proper exercise of the
authority delegated to the Commission under that Act. 2 '

Neither party to the action sought a rehearing, but the SEC filed
an application for permission to file an amicus curiae petition for
rehearing, stating that it was then engaged in a re-evaluation of
X-16B-3. Permission to file was granted, but upon consideration of
the SEC's brief, the majority refused the petition for rehearing,
adding that:
In the meantime, pending any modification of the rule after such reevaluation, it would seem that any reliance upon it by persons entitled
to exercise stock purchase options under employee-stock option plans
substantially similar to that here in issue would be ill-advised."'
Judge Lumbard again dissented from this holding, reaffirming his
belief that rule X-13B-3 should be held to be a valid exercise of
the Commission's power.
The majority opinion seems clearly wrong. As pointed out in the
9
amicus curiae memorandum of the SEC:"
(1) The court had before it a situation in which Congress obviously intended the SEC on the basis of its continuous experience to
determine and exempt situations where the possibility of abuse is
slight when weighed against interference with otherwise legitimate
rights.
(2) The Second Circuit's indication that the Commission's balancing of interests (the interest against insider manipulation for
private benefit and the interest against interference with legitimate
trading) is not a proper test of commission exemption, and the further indication that if any abuse, however slight, can be envisioned
127247

F.2d 689, 692-93

(1957).

121 Id. at 697.
'"9Reprinted at CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., para. 90821, paras. 92575-78

(1957).
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by reason of an exemptive rule, the rule is invalid, amounts to
writing out of the statute the Commission's rule making power in

its entirety. In the words of the memorandum, "We can conceive
of no exemptive rule on the basis of which the possibility of insider
trading abuses cannot be envisioned."
(3) The exemption of restricted stock option plans was carefully thought out and is just, for, again in the words of the memorandum:
The application of Section 16(b) to the exercise of these restricted
stock options might often frustrate the purpose of such plans by turning back to the issuer a profit-based essentially on a long term accretion in value-which the stockholders presumably intended should
inure to the holder of the option."'
V. ENFORCEMENT

a. The Right to Sue
The statute itself gives "any security holder" the right to bring
suit to require the payment of insiders' short-swing profits to the
corporation. The first case involving section 16(b), Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., established that the statute creates a derivative right
of action in every stockholder, "regardless of the fact that he has
no holdings from the class of securities subjected to a short-swing
operation or that he can receive no tangible benefits, directly or indirectly, from an action because of his position in the security
hierarchy." This language was not essential to the disposition of
the Smolowe case, since the point was not there raised as a defense,
but a specific holding to the same effect was made in Benisch v.
Cameron, where the court said:
[Ijt is plain from the reasons set forth in Section 2 of the Act . . .
and in the preamble to Section 16 (b), that it was primarily intended as
an 'instrument of a statutory policy of which the general public is the
ultimate beneficiary.' Congress did not intend procedural restrictions
to hamper such policy. . . . [Plaintiff did not have to comply with
rule 23 (b).] 8'

The absolute right of any security holder to sue (subject to the
"sixty-day notice" provisions), or to intervene in a suit, whether
or not he owned his security at the time of the transactions comat 92578.
Supp. 882, 884-85 (1948). Rule 23(b), Fed.
plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit must aver that
defendant corporation at the time of the transactions of
his shares thereafter devolved upon him by operation of
130Id.

''81 F.

R. Civ. P., requires that the
he was a shareholder of the
which he complains, or that
law.
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plained of and regardless of his motives, has been re-affirmed by
the Second Circuit in the Mission Corporation and Magida cases,
by the Fifth Circuit in Dottenheim v. Murchison, and by the Ninth
Circuit in the case of Pellegrino v. Nesbit."
The Second Circuit early held in the Park & Tilford case that the
right to bring suit included the right of a minority shareholder to
intervene as plaintiff under rule 24(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure where necessary to guard against the likely failure
of the plaintiff corporation to prosecute diligently a suit for recovery of profits made by one of its own officers, directors, or beneficial owners of more than ten per cent of a class of its securities.
The right of intervention was again upheld in Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, where it appeared probable that the corporation involved would not diligently prosecute the suit, and in
spite of the fact that plaintiff's interest in the corporation was
minute.
The broad nature of the intervention right was finally and completely established in Pellegrino v. Nesbit, where the complaining
stockholder moved for leave to intervene, after entry of final judgment in favor of plaintiff corporation, for the purpose of appealing
the decision. Reversing the trial court's denial of the motion, the
Ninth Circuit spoke of a complaining stockholder's right to intervene "as a matter of right" wherever the prosecuting corporation
may fail "diligently to prosecute" a suit it has instituted to recover
short-swing profits. The court said:
If, subsequent to commencement of suit, a corporation's Board of
Directors can determine with finality that prosecution of insiders will
not be in the best interests of the company, and thereby foreclose stock-

holder action, the opportunity for evasion of statutory policy is
obvious."'
b. The rSixty-day Period"
Although section 16(b) specifically provides that a complaining
stockholder cannot bring suit for the recovery of profits on behalf
of the corporation until sixty days after demand on the corporation
.. For earlier cases on the immateriality of plaintiff's motives in bringing suit, see notes

38 and 39, supra, and accompanying text. The most recent case on the point is Blau v.
Albert, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90836 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1957).
' 203 F.2d 463, 467 (1953). The stockholder, though appealing from the trial court's
refusal of its motion to intervene, did not seek an extension of the thirty-day statutory
period for appeal of the trial court's judgment on the merits. Although the Ninth
Circuit decided not to consider the question pending intervenor's action in seeking to
appeal, it would appear that his failure to seek an extension of the appeal period probably
foreclosed the recovery which would otherwise have been obtained.
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to bring suit, it was early held in Grossman v. Young..4 that the
sixty-day waiting period was not required where the insider controlled the management of the corporation, demand in such a case
presumptively being futile. In the same case it was also held that
the waiting period was intended for the benefit of the corporation
and not for the benefit of the profiting insider, being designed
only to provide the corporation with a reasonable opportunity
to institute suit, and that therefore the defendant insider has no
standing to raise the question of non-compliance with the sixty-day
limitation.
The holding that the profiting insider has no standing to object
to plaintiff stockholder's failure to wait out the sixty-day period
was reaffirmed in Benisch v. Cameron. And Blau v. Ogsbury covered the field, holding that (1) plaintiff need not be a stockholder
at the time of the transaction complained of; (2) his motives in
bringing suit are immaterial; and (3) his failure to observe the
sixty-day waiting period cannot be raised by the insider.
Two recent cases from the Southern District of New York have
further clarified the nature of the sixty-day period. In Henss v.
Schneider,' a complaining stockholder brought suit against both
the insider and the corporation to recover profits under section 16
(b). The court sustained the motion of the corporate defendant
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the suit was improperly
brought within the sixty-day period, since plaintiff stockholder
had alleged no facts to justify his precipitate filing and had resisted
the motion to dismiss merely by arguing a series of hypothetical
situations based on wrongful conduct of the corporation or the
insiders. The court said:
If in a given case, the corporate rights may be defeated because of improper conduct or lack of diligence by corporate officers, then such
facts should be alleged in the complaint ....
To permit the commencement of suits prior to the expiration of the specified period where no
facts are pleaded to justify it, not only flies in the face of the clear
mandate of the law, but would subject a corporation to harrassment by
a multiplicity of suits by its security holders, all of whom would be
equally entitled to assert corporate right. 3 '
F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
"' 132 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see same case at 132 F. Supp. 64.
136 Id. at 62-63. Plaintiffs objected to dismissal on the further grounds that their re13472

quest to the corporation to bring suit was made not entirely for the benefit of the
corporation, but also to lay the foundation for the allowance of attorney's fees. The court
brushed this objection aside, pointing out that if the plaintiff's activities compelled action
by the corporation resulting in the recapture of insider's profits, whether by suit or
otherwise, they would be entitled in an independent action to recover their legal expenses for such services.
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That the Henss case evidenced no change in the courts' general
position on the sixty-day period was evidenced in the 1956 case
of Netter v. Ashland Paper Mills, Inc., 7 where the court held that
the complaining stockholder could bring his own suit to recover
section 16(b) profits without making any demand whatsoever
on the corporation to sue, where it was alleged and proved that
a demand would have been useless. The futility of such a demand
was shown as a matter of law where the profiting insider owned
and controlled more than a majority of the corporation's stock,
and where he and his family constituted the board of directors
and officers of the corporation.

c. Limitations
Section 16(b) specifically provides that no suit for the recovery
of insider's short-swing profits shall be brought "more than two
years after the date such profit was realized." Nevertheless, Grossman v. Young early established that a defendant's mere failure to file
reports of dealings in his corporation's stock, as required by section
16(a), amounted to fraud, thus calling into play the rule of Holmberg v. Armbrecht,"8 to the effect that into every federal statute

of limitations is read the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff
has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without
any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the

statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though
there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party
committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other
party. Several older cases attempted to modify the rule requiring
tolling of the statute where reports of insider stock dealings were
not timely filed. In Fistal v. Christman.. the court held that where
the defendant has filed a report as required by section 16(a), limitations run, not from the date the report is filed, but from the date
of the realization of the profit. And in Carr-ConsolidatedBiscuit Co.
v. Moore, ' it was held that the statute of limitations was not tolled,
even though the defendant insider did not file reports under section 16(a) until the SEC brought a lawsuit to compel him to do
so, since the president and secretary of the plaintiff corporation had
actual knowledge of the transactions complained of at the time
they occurred. The court held that in order to rely upon fraud to
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90766 (S.D.N.Y.
""327 U.S. 392 (1946).
"0 13 F.R.D. 245 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
131CCH

'40 125 F. Supp. 423

(M.D. Pa. 1954).

1956).
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toll the two year statute under section 16(b), the plaintiff must
show reliance upon defendant's misleading conduct. The Carr-Consolidated holding is highly questionable.
A further limitation on the time of suit, evidencing a strict construction of the two-year period, is indicated by Blau v. Ogsbury,
where the court held that even where the transaction complained
of consists of a sale and a subsequent purchase, limitations start
to run on the date of the sale, since that is "the date such profit
4 ' where an insider
was realized." And in Dabney v. Atlas Corp.,"
sold stock for cash plus an option to buy stock in another corporation, the court held that limitations began to run on the date
of the original sale of stock for cash-plus-option, and not on the
date the stock of the third-party corporation was acquired or sold.
The court pointed out that the exercise of the option and the subsequent sale of the option stock constituted an entirely separate
transaction. Profit was "realized" within the meaning of section
16(b) when the original stock was sold for cash and the presumably
valuable option to buy other stock.
A return to the principles of Grossman v. Young, requiring a
tolling of the statute where reports are not timely filed, is indicated
by Blau v. Albert. There the defendant insider moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's action was not commenced within the two-year period from the time that the alleged
profits were realized. Defendant attempted to distinguish Grossman
v. Young on the ground that there was no claim of fraud and that
no fraud could in fact have been practiced upon plaintiff since he
did not become a stockholder until the last of the insider's reports
under section 16(a) were filed. In holding that the plaintiff's action was not barred, the court said:
But the only fraud necessary to invoke the Federal equitable doctrine
is a violation of the statutory policy against trading by insiders, concealment of that violation, whether intentional or inadvertent, effectively prevents suit and demands the 'mitigating construction'
of the
14
statute of limitations given by the Court in other contexts. 2

d. Jurisdiction and Venue
American Distilling Co. v. Brown... established that exclusive
jurisdiction over section 16(b) actions is in the federal courts;
the case has never been seriously challenged. Although section 16
141

42

CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90650

(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
(Dec. 16, 1957).

1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. paras. 90636, 90637
143295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347 (1945).
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(b) does not directly provide that an officer, director or beneficial
owner "violates" the statute by engaging in short-swing transactions, but merely makes him a constructive trustee of the corporation to the extent of profits, Gratz v. Claughton, discussed
above, established that, by analogy to general fiduciary principles,
the wrong consists in obtaining profits by a short-swing purchase
and sale (which the court referred to as "wrongful purchase and
sale") or sale and purchase. Thus, when any of the purchases or
sales complained of are executed on a national exchange, venue
under section 27 to enforce the payment of profits to the corporation may lie within the district where the exchange is located.
Gratz v. Claughton was followed on this point in Falco v. Donner
Foundation, Inc., and in Blau v. Mission Corp., in both of which
the Second Circuit upheld venue in the district in which the New
York Stock Exchange was located on the ground that "some" of the
transactions involved were consummated on the Exchange floor.
Perhaps the most interesting venue case is Blau v. Lamb."' Plaintiff, a stockholder in Air-Way Industries, Inc., sued the defendants,
residents of Ohio, for profits allegedly made by them on a transaction, the "purchase" part of which involved the defendants'
acquistion of Air-Way preferred stock in exchange for stock in
another corporation, and the "sale" part of which was a conversion,
within six months, of the preferred stock into Air-Way common.
Both transactions took place in Ohio. Plaintiff alleged venue in
the Southern District of New York by virtue of the fact that
nine days before the conversion of the preferred into common,
defendants had sold a negligible amount of other common stock
on the American Stock Exchange. Even though the 100 shares
sold on the Exchange were at a price substantially lower than the
price at which defendants "purchased" the large block of common
stock by conversion of their previously acquired preferred, the
court held that venue was properly laid in New York, on the
following reasoning.
Under Gratz v. Claughton, the mere incidence of the 100-share
sale-7,000-share purchase within the six months constituted a
violation, whether a profit was made or not; under section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act any action under the act may be
brought in any district wherein any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred; and under Falco v. Donner Foundation, and
Blau v. Mission Corp., one act occurring in a given district is
14420 F.R.D. 411

(S.D.N.Y.

1957).
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sufficient to fix venue there with reference to other similar transactions taking place in other districts. Judge Dimock observed in
Blau v. Lamb:
There probably never was a more tenuous thread of jurisdiction, but
I think it holds.14
The thread apparently does hold, but Judge Hand, in writing
the Gratz v. Claughton opinion, probably never realized the lengths
to which it could be logically extended.

e. Nature of Action, Burden of Proof and Abatement
Arbetman v. Playford early established that a suit by a complaining stockholder to recover short-swing profits for his corporation under section 16(b) is a derivative suit in the nature
of an equitable action, and that the plaintiff has his choice of
remedies-if the plaintiff does not himself demand a jury trial,
the defendant's demand for a jury trial will, upon plaintiff's motion,
be vacated.
The case of Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp. held that, once
plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of a profit made by a
defendant insider as a result of short-swing transactions, then the
insider has the burden of proving to what extent his profits are
less than the maximum prima facie showing, or that they are nonexistent. If the defendant's proof leaves the amount of profit uncertain, then judgment is to be rendered against him for the maximum figure. The court remanded the cause, since the lower court
had held for the defendant on the ground that it had rebutted the
plaintiff's prima facie showing of a profit and the plaintiff had
thereafter failed to sustain the burden of proof on showing a profit.
On remand, " as one might suspect, the lower court again held for the
defendant after considering all the evidence, finding that the defendant had sustained its burden of showing no profit.
Pellegrino v. Wright," ' the only case dealing with the point, held
that a section 16(b) action is not penal, and therefore does not
abate on the death of the defendant insider but continues against
his estate.
VI.

ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Smolowe case established at the very outset of insiders' profits litigation the principle that:
1415Id. at
146

'

47

414.

149 F. Supp. 390

(S.D.N.Y.

197).

CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90602

(D. Md. 19Y2).
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A stockholder who is successful in maintaining such an action is entitled to reimbursement for reasonable attorney's fees on the theory
that the corporation which has received the benefit of the attorney's
services [through recovery of the insider's short-swing profits] should
pay the reasonable value thereof.14
The court held that the failure of the corporation to bring a
section 16(b) action, and the institution or prosecution of such
action by a security holder for the corporation, creates a derivative right of action, with the moving party therefore entitled to
attorney's fees out of the sum recovered. The court rejected the
contention that since attorney's fees were specifically made recoverable in actions under other sections of the Securities Exchange Act,
they were therefore not intended to be recoverable since not specifically made so under section 16(b).
The lower court in Smolowe awarded $3,000.00 attorney's fees
although the plaintiff owned only 150 shares out of a total 800,000,
so that while he saved the corporation $18,000.00, his share was
only $3.38. In upholding the trial court's award, the Second Circuit said:
While the allowance made here was quite substantial we are not disposed to interfere with the district court's well considered determination. . . . Since in many cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement
of section 16(b), the allowance must not be too niggardly.1 '
The Park & Tilford case approved an allowance of attorney's fees
without comment. At the close of the Park FJ Tilford litigation,
the ultimate allowance to the plaintiff for attorney's fees amounted
to $69,232.83, plus ten per cent of a payment by one insider on
his conversion of 274 shares.11 '
In Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co.,' the plaintiff-stockholder's attorney had, at plaintiff's instigation, investigated dealings
in the corporation's securities by its president. After investigation
the attorney had forwarded a letter to the corporation informing
it of the president's unlawful profits and demanding that suit be
commenced to recover them. The corporation thereupon, without
legal action, recovered $57,872.00 from the president. Two claims
were presented: one by the assignee of the attorney's cause of action,
141 136 F.2d 231, 241 (1943).
(Citing, for comparison, Hutchinson Box Board and
Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (8th Cir. 1924); In re Natural Dry Ginger Ale
Corp., 9 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.Y. 1935)).
149Ibid.
10 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90413 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For a discussion of the
Park & Tilford allowance see Comment, 27 Texas L. Rev. 840, 848-49 (1947).
117 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
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to recover the reasonable value of the attorney's services; the other
by the plaintiff stockholder himself, to recover his reasonable attorney's fees. The court rejected the assignee's claim, since there

was obviously no available proof that the corporation either expressly
hired the dissenting stockholder's attorney, nor were there circumstances from which such an agreement of hire might be in-

ferred. However, the claim brought by the stockholder himself
was upheld, on the authority of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. The
court rejected the distinction attempted to be made by the defendant
that attorney's fees were recoverable by a prosecuting stockholder
under section 16(b) only where the prosecuting stockholder's attorney is actually involved in litigation, saying:
It would appear that the purpose of the statute would be as effectively
thwarted if such distinction were to be approved as if reimbursement
were to be denied entirely. If the objective is the recovery by the
corporation of unlawful profits, would it be reasonable to say that a
stockholder shall be entitled to all his expenses if he needs to bring suit,
but that he shall be denied reimbursement where the same benefit to
the corporation has resulted without the necessity of legal proceedings
and at less expense? This would be penalizing efficiency and expediency." 2
The court in Dottenheim pointed out that the reasonableness
of the attorney's fees requested is a matter for the court. The
cited case merely denied a motion to dismiss; on later hearing the
court allowed $1,000.00 (as against a claim for $14,468.00), the
comparative smallness of the fee being attributable to the fact that
the attorney merely made a simple investigation and wrote one
letter, and to the court's belief that the corporation would have
acted itself if left entirely alone, its reason for delay being to ascertain whether or not the Smolowe case was to be qualified by later
holdings."'

In Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. Wigmore'" the court granted
a motion for intervention by a minority stockholder with the condition that if the corporation, which had already brought suit,
recovered the insider's profits, it would not have to pay the intervenor's attorney for services which its own counsel also rendered.
The courts necessarily continue to recognize that in many cases,
in the words of the Smolowe case, "the possibility of recovering

attorney's fees
11Id.

"

provides the sole stimulus for the enforcement

at 197.

' See Comment,
4

. . .

27 Texas L. Rev. 840, 848 (1947).
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90376 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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of section 16(b) .. . ."' However, the last two cases to comment on attorney's fees indicate a growing awareness of and concern
for the inherent evils in the present system, in which the section
16(b) suit benefits the complaining stockholder hardly at all,
but can greatly benefit his attorney. Thus in many cases attorneys
may engage in champertous conduct in order to recover fees. Equally
dangerous is the fact that, once the suit is filed, the stockholder's
attorney can often recover a fee by settlement with a defendant
insider. If he wishes to do so (as he usually will), he is no longer
effectuating the congressional intent to protect the interests of
the stockholders and the corporation; and the effectuation of this
intent is the only reason for the allowance of attorney's fees in
the first place.
Thus, in Fistal v. Christman the court refused to permit the
dismissal of a stockholder's action under section 16 (b) where the
agreement for dismissal was conditioned upon the defendant's payment of $2,500.00 to the plaintiff for the costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) of maintaining the action. The plaintiff's
attorney prepared his request for approval of the dismissal carefully, urging as reasons therefor: (1) that there was some question
as to whether the venue of the action was proper; (2) the difficulty for the plaintiff to prove that the insider actually realized
profit from the transaction; and (3) that even in the event of
successful litigation, the amount of recovery would be so small
that it would hardly cover expenses. At the argument the corporation stated that it did not object to the proposed dismissal. In
spite of the above, however, the judge in a carefully reasoned opinion
refused to approve the dismissal of the action, since it was conditioned on the plaintiff's attorney receiving a payment from the
defendant. After discussing the fact that the allowance for a
stockholder's attorney's fees in most, if not all, instances provided
the only impetus to enforcement of section 16(b),' the court
said:
As long as the interests of the security holders, the corporation, and the
155 136 F.2d 231,
133

241

F. Supp. 300, 304

(1943), discussed above. And as stated in Fistal v. Christman,
(S.D.N.Y. 1955):

"But the statute does not offer any hope of reward to the security holder who brings
an action under Section 16(b) other than the satisfaction derived from a good deed
well done and the extent to which the value of his interest in the corporation might
be increased by reason of a recovery. Perhaps because of this lack of an appreciable
material reward, or because most investors have neither the means or knowledge needed
to engage in an investigation for the purpose of determining if the grounds for an
action under Section 16(b) exist, attorneys have largely pre-empted their position as
enforcers of Section 16(b)."
'"For the court's statement, see note 149, supra.
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attorney for the plaintiff-security holder parallel each other there is no
reason to fear that this reliance is misplaced. These interests do parallel each other when the fee of the attorney for the plaintiff-security
holder is contingent upon his success in imposing the statutory penalty
on the 'insider' and is payable from the corporation's recovery. Under
these circumstances the self-interest of the attorney for the plaintiffsecurity holder corresponds exactly with the interests of the public,
the security holders and the corporation.
But once the attorney for the plaintiff-security holder can recover a
fee from the defendant 'insider' his interests and those of the public,
the security holders, and the corporation diverge. For his interest in
the enforcement of Section 16(b) is then affected by the fact that he
can profit from the dismissal of an action on condition that the 'insider' pay him a fee, and his reliability as an enforcer of the statutory
policy is susceptible of doubt.
I therefore believe that the policy and purposes of Section 16(b) are
best served by disapproval of any dismissal of an action under that
statute that is conditioned on the plaintiff's attorney receiving any
payment from the defendant 'insider.' Since the proposed dismissal is
so conditioned, it is hereby disapproved."5 7
In Magida v. Continental Can Co., the lower court had refused
to allow an amendment to the defendant's answer to include an
alleged defense of champerty. The lower court permitted an offer
of proof, principally by depositions, to show that plaintiff's attorney was the real party in interest, that his sole motive in prosecuting the action was to obtain a counsel fee, and that no true
relation of attorney and client existed. The Second Circuit noted
that the true facts of the arrangement between the attorney and
client were "heavily obscured by numerous invocations of the
attorney-client privilege by the attorney of record,. 158 but in line
with the philosophy of earlier decisions, held that even if the defense of champerty were fully proved, it would be insufficient in
law to defeat the suit, since:
The relationship between his attorney and the plaintiff, who is the mere
vehicle of recovery, cannot defeat the rights of the corporation and
other stockholders, to whom the recovery accrues. . . .If there has
been a violation of N. Y. Penal Law, Section 274, as alleged, offenders
are liable to its criminal sanction. But the public policy of New York
cannot nullify this federally created right established for the effectuation of a broad federal policy.
157

133 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (1955).
847-48 (1956), referring to the record in the lower court, Magida

158 231 F.2d 843,

v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y.

1951).
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The court however went on to say:
Judge Ryan has specifically reserved these matters as alleged by Continental [champerty] for a later consideration in connection with the
allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee. A showing of misconduct is
naturally pertinent to the determination of an appropriate fee. 9

The total recovery to the corporation in the Magida suit amounted
to $47,000.00. The petition for attorney's fees was for $23,500.00.

On the subsequent hearing
firmed its inherent power
the plaintiff's attorney had
justify withholding his fee.

on attorney's fees' the trial court afto investigate and determine whether
been guilty of such misconduct as to
The court went on to say that there

was no direct proof of a champertous agreement, and:
[T]he retainer of petitioner was oral, and although it is very likely that
petitioner did pay the expenses of the suit in return for his retainer
and fee, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the probable
existence of such conduct in these suits should not bar the attorney
from receiving an allowance. . . . The personal feelings of the court
on the subject aside, its duty is to aid in the enforcement of the statute
by encouraging such suits and by making an allowance which is not
'too niggardly' and which will often provide 'the sole stimulus for the
enforcement of Section 16(b)'. . . . It is for the Congress, if it sees
fit, to curb the evil side effects of the statute by imposing appropriate
restrictions.'

The court, however, cut the attorney's fees to $12,000.00, which
though certainly a substantial amount, was probably by no means exorbitant, as indicated by the fact that there are five district court

opinions, the opinion of the court of appeals, and the denial of
writ of certiorari appearing in the books. There is little risk in

predicting that the courts will hereafter be forced to re-examine
the allowance of attorney's fees in section 16(b) cases unless
Congress itself passes legislation, or unless the severe sanctions of
the section eventually remove insiders' profits entirely from the
economic picture-both doubtful results.
VII. TAX TREATMENT
When the insider pays over short-swing profits to the corporation as a result of the operation of section 16(b), each has a tax
problem. The insider wishes to take a deduction for the payment
as a business expense or loss, or at the very least to add the
Id. at 848.
' 0 Magida v. Continental Can Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 90777 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
'a'Id. at 92390-91.
"0
6
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amount of the payment to the basis of his remaining stock.
The corporation, of course, desires not to consider the payment
as taxable income. Both questions appeared to be settled in 1951
and 1952. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States... held
that payments of insiders' profits were taxable income to the corporation receiving them, as a "windfall." William F. Davis, Jr.' held
that the insider paying his profits over to the corporation was not
entitled to a deduction even though he had paid tax on the gain
when realized, since to allow it would frustrate the sharply defined public policy of section 16 (b). Although the Tax Court divided
nine to seven in the Davis case, most practitioners interpreted it as
establishing the rule that no deduction or loss could be taken for
the payment of insiders' profits to the corporation under any
circumstances. "4 This belief was re-enforced by Judge Tietjens'
decision in William L. Dempsey,' in which he merely detailed
certain facts showing that petitioner had realized short-swing profits and had paid them to the corporation, claiming a deduction at
the time of payment, following his statement of facts by the following opinion (quoted in full):
The facts in this case differ in no material respects from those in
William F. Davis, Jr. [citation omitted], and we consider ourselves
bound by the decision there. Accordingly, decision will be entered for
the respondent.16
The Commissioner's position that insiders' profits are taxable
income to the corporation receiving them, which had been upheld
in the Park & Tilford Distillers case was again upheld in General

Investors, Inc. v. Commissioner'. and in Noma Elec. Corp.' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the General American Investors case and, in a brief decision by Chief Justice Warren, held that
such payments were indeed taxable income to the corporation."'
162 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
16317 T.C. 549 (1951).
164For example, see Loss, Securities Regulation 579 (1955 Supp.).
165 10 T.C.M. 936 (1951).

'Oid. at 938.
167211 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1954).
66 12 T.C.M. 1 (1953).
168U.S. 434 (1955). The Court stated that certiorari had been granted only because

of a possible conflict with Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., and the decision was
based on the reasoning in the Glenshaw Glass case, decided the same day, 348 U.S. 426
(1955), that the inclusion in the general definition of gross income (Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 22(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61) of the phrase "or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever" indicated a congressional intent to tax income
from whatever source derived, and included such "instances of undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion" as triple
damages under the anti-trust statutes, as in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., and
§ 16(b) insiders' profits, as in General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner.
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But in the corollary area of deductibility to the insider of the
payments made to the corporation, the case of William F. Davis, Jr.,
after apparently becoming strongly entrenched as a leading authority, turned out to be a strong man with a glass chin. In 1952
the Treasury Department, relying on the Davis case, formally
ruled that no deduction could be taken by an insider for the amount
of payments made to his corporation in accordance with section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, nor could such amount be
added to the basis of securities retained by him. 7 ' And in 1955,
in Robert Lehman, 1 ' the Tax Court detailed another set of facts
showing liability under section 16(b) imposed although the defendant was innocent of any wrongdoing, and a subsequent attempt by the defendant to take a deduction for the profit repaid
to the corporation, then disposed of the issue with the following
brief words:
This issue was extensively discussed in William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C.
549 (1951), and a holding reached adverse to petitioner. That case is
dispositive of this issue and we hold that no deduction is allowable to
petitioner with respect to such payment.7
It thus appeared that all section 16(b) payments by the insider
to his corporation were taxable to the corporation and non-deductible to the insider.
But at the end of 1956 the deductibility question was thrown
into unexpected and almost complete uncertainty by the full tax
court, in Laurence M. Marks.' Petitioner was an influential investment banker in New York, engaged for over forty years in
the business of underwriting and dealing in securities. Since 1945
he had been a director of Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation, his
firm dealing in Shamrock's stock in its normal course of business.
In 1947 an issue of Shamrock stock was made on the floor of
the New York Stock Exchange. The issue was unsuccessful, and
petitioner's firm purchased 14,800 shares remaining unsold in order
to avoid an unfavorable effect on the value of Shamrock stock
170 I.T. 4069,

1952-1 Cum. Bull. 28.
17'25 T.C. 629 (1955).
'72 Id. at 635. The point above discussed involved Mr. Lehman's directorship in PanAmerican Airways Corp. The case is additionally interesting since it also dealt with Mr.
Lehman's receipt of the whiskey purchase warrants which were the subject of Park &
Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte. On this point the court held Mr. Lehman entitled to long-term
capital gain treatment upon his disposition of the whiskey purchase warrants after holding them more than six months, against the Commissioner's contention that Park & Tilford was anticipatorily assigning income and that Mr. Lehman should therefore have
treated his profits on their sale as ordinary income.
17327 T.C. 464 (1956).
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already in the market. The firm disposed of these shares over a
period of several months.
On another occasion the firm bought 4,500 shares of Shamrock
from a trust company, disposing of them to its customers in the
regular course of business. On a third occasion the firm joined an
underwriting group headed by another corporation, participating
in an issue of Shamrock stock to the extent of 10,000 shares;
petitioner did not want to participate but feared that his refusal
would prejudice the success of the issue. On a fourth occasion petitioner's firm purchased 5,000 shares from and at the request of a
good customer, taking several months during 1948 to dispose of this
stock in an orderly manner. The firm realized a gross profit in the
amount of $45,313.05 from the above dealings and reported the
profit as ordinary income. Petitioner included his share of the profits
($17,672.08) as ordinary income in 1948 and 1949.
Some time later the SEC indicated to Shamrock that it should
recover from the petitioner his share of the profits. Although petitioner's counsel advised him that, while there was substantial doubt,
he was probably not liable to the company under section 16(b),
the petitioner agreed with the other directors of Shamrock that
avoidance of litigation was to the best interest of all concerned and,
without admitting liability, paid Shamrock $17,672.08 in voluntary
settlement of the claim. Petitioner never traded or dealed in Shamrock stock for his own account while a director, but shortly after
becoming a director he purchased 4,000 Shamrock shares, which he
still owned at the time of the Tax Court decision.
The Tax Court, with three dissents, held that petitioner was entitled to a deduction for the amounts paid to Shamrock, as a business expense allowable under section 23 (a) of the 1939 Code. The
court said that in William F. Davis, Jr. it had not ruled that payments made in accordance with section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act were ipso facto non-deductible, but that the Davis case
merely followed the rule that if, under the facts of each individual
case, a sharply defined public policy would be violated by allowing
a deduction, the deduction would be denied. The court pointed out
that in the present case petitioner never admitted liability under
section 16(b), no determination was ever made by the SEC or any
other tribunal that petitioner had violated section 16(b), and that
under the circumstances the allowance of the deduction sought by
petitioner would not frustrate any sharply defined public policy.
The dissenters were unable to distinguish Marks in principle from
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As a result of the Marks case, there is a wide uncharted area of
varying fact situations, some of which may produce deductibility
of insider's profits paid to the insider's corporation, and others which
will produce non-deductibility. Obviously it will take many lawsuits to draw the line.74
VIII. SUMMARY

The first case arising under section 16(b), Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., established a pattern of broad interpretation to curb abuses
by corporate insiders of their positions of trust. Subsequent decisions
up to this time have with almost no exceptions evidenced a continued determination by the courts to effectuate the congressional
policy of protection against misconduct. The courts still have not
been able to establish a dividing line between transactions which
constitute "sales" and "purchases" and those which do not, and find
themselves faced with the growing problem of the effect of a liberal
allowance of attorney's fees in fostering champerty. The Tax Court
has unexpectedly confused the question of deductibility by the profiting insider of payments made to his corporation, and many other
troublesome points under section 16(b) have not as yet been presented.
The last few years have witnessed the entry of courts other than
those of New York into the field of section 16(b) litigation, with
at least the circuit courts showing an excellent understanding of the
principles and philosophy of the short-swing profits provisions.
The Commission regulations issued and amended during the past
few years seem well-adjusted to social and economic realities and
.74
Petitioner in the Marks case claimed his deduction either as a business expense under
23(a), Int. Rev. Code of 1939 (now § 62, Int. Rev. Code of 1954), or as a loss incurred in trade or business under S 23(e) (now § 65). Since the court sustained the deduction under 23 (a), it did not reach the question of whether a deduction may ever be
claimed for profits paid to a corporation under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
by an insider who is not in the investment business, and who therefore must rely upon
23(e) for his deduction.
Since Marks had reported his profits as ordinary income, the allowance of the deduction did not give him any extra tax benefits. In the Davis case the petitioner had reported
his profits as long-term capital gain, and thus the allowance of the deduction would not
only have made him whole, as far as taxes were concerned, but would have given him a
profit. The courts will thus be faced with an interesting problem, when and if they
have a case in which the facts bring the taxpayer within the rule of the Marks case, but
he has reported his profits as long-term capital gain. There do not seem to be any grounds
for allowing the taxpayer in such a case to deduct -the amount of the payment to the
corporation from the basis of his remaining stock (in lieu of taking a deduction) ; there
seems to be some merit in Judge Murdoch's dissent in the Davis case, proposing that
a deduction be denied but that petitioner be allowed to amend his returns for the years
in which he reported profit, so as to deduct the amount of the payment to the corporation in such years.
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more importantly, appear eminently just. As has always been the
case in section 16(b) litigation, only the pure are haled into courtand, at that, only the pure who have some additional claim to
mercy. It thus appears that the harsh, objective, "no excuses taken"
rule of section 16(b) continues to perform the purpose for which
it was enacted. For a rule admittedly crude, it has served remarkably well, and it is to be hoped that not only will the courts continue in as satisfactory a manner as heretofore to effectuate the congressional purposes under the present law,"' but also that the SEC
will soon win its long, though intermittent and sometimes desultory
fight for extension of this and other salutary provisions of the regulatory acts to at least the larger companies without listed securities."7 '

"' While the Second Circuit has developed tremendous competence in this field, its
recent challenge to the power of the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate
exemptive rules is ill-founded, and could tend to subvert the congressional purpose.
'Currently
pending before Congress are Senate Bills 594 and 1168. S. 1168 was
reported favorably, with amendment, on July 24, 1957. It would subject to the provisions
of § 16(b) the officers, directors and principal stockholders of certain larger companies
without securities listed on a national exchange, a desirable expansion of the act.

